

**SECRET**

17 February 1950

The Honorable  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Intelligence Advisory Committee at its meeting on 17 February 1950 has asked me to inform you of its view concerning the importance of the Service Attache to the national intelligence structure. It is the opinion of the Committee that our Service Attaches are the backbone of the military intelligence collection effort. Their presence is particularly valuable in the countries behind the Iron Curtain where intelligence collection means are difficult to apply.

The military information obtained from the Service Attaches in the Satellite countries, while not so complete as desired, is a major contribution to the accomplishment of the intelligence mission assigned by the National Security Council to the agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

Very sincerely yours,

R. H. Hillenkoetter  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

Copies to:  
Members of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Director  
AD/ORE  
CCAPS ✓  
Central Records

DIA review(s) completed.

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48555

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ER-O-7933

TO : Assistant Director, ORE

DATE: 12 December 1949

FROM : Chief, Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Service Attaches

1. With reference to our October 1949 memoranda on the above subject, there is enclosed as of possible interest to you 1948 background material which I have just received.

2. Kindly return this file to COAPS when you have read it.



PRESCOTT CHILDS  
Chief, COAPS

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
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Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400040004-1



10 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of the Army  
Secretary of the Navy  
Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Coordination of the Army, Navy and Air Force Attache Systems

1. The Air Force Attaches have, by agreement between the Departments of the Army and Air Force, been separated from control by the Department of the Army and will hereafter be directly under the Department of the Air Force. With the establishment of a separate Air Attache system, the time seems appropriate to consider how the three separate attache systems for Army, Navy and Air respectively can best work together for their common benefit, and to put into effect measures for the coordination of the three systems.

2. The agreements reached between the Army and Air Force demonstrate some of the ways in which coordination can be achieved in certain administrative matters. It may be that these arrangements can be extended and it would be important that the Navy participate fully in renewed discussions of these problems and, where possible, in their implementation.

3. It is also important that the three attache systems work together in giving more effective intelligence coverage by supplementing and assisting each other's efforts in the actual procurement of intelligence. I believe that, at the present time, such coordination is largely sporadic and, in some cases, has developed simply from local exigencies rather than in accordance with the purposeful pursuit of a common goal. There are, undoubtedly, ways in which the three Services can more effectively coordinate their efforts with regard to such matters as the training and briefing of attaches, the establishment of collection requirements, the actual procurement of intelligence in the field and its evaluation. In considering these questions you should bear in mind the relevant National Security Council Intelligence Directives as well as the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence for the coordination of intelligence.

4. The purpose of examining this problem is not merely to find ways of saving money by eliminating duplication and pooling common services. Although this is certainly important, there is the overriding objective of achieving whatever measure of coordination is necessary in order to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Military Establishment.

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5. I wish to request, therefore, that the three Services, under the coordination of the Department of the Army, jointly examine this problem in order to achieve the effective coordination of their respective attaché systems. I hope that you will progressively put into effect those measures of coordination which seem necessary and that you will report to me by 31 December 1948 on the steps you have taken by that date; at the same time you should report on those measures which it is still proposed to put into effect and those on which it has been impossible to reach an agreement.

James Forrestal

RBlum:rld

7 July 1948

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ERW

19 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. ONLY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE

Subject: Unified Attache System

1. Basic papers are returned herewith.
2. From a purely intelligence standpoint, there is no reason why the offices as contrasted with the officers of Army, Air and Naval attache offices could not be consolidated. Were the officers to be consolidated, there would be a considerable loss from a standpoint of intelligence.
3. However, before such consolidation of offices is put into effect, I think the whole subject should be carefully investigated because the suggested procedures bear a great similarity to the idea of using elephant guns to shoot flies. I think General Lutes memorandum is not too clear inasmuch as I think you will find, upon investigation, that in most of the diplomatic missions the armed forces attaches have offices in the respective embassies. In some places where the embassy itself is too small the attaches have a separate office or building, usually housing all of them. In a few places they may have separate buildings, but I think these places will be found to be very few in number.
4. Further, your personnel savings is going to be ridiculously small. It is hard to make many savings where your total clerical personnel amounts to two or three people. How communication charges are to be saved is a little difficult to understand because it does not matter whether the reports come from an Army, Navy or Air attache, if the same number of reports are cabled into Washington, the charges will be the same whether one man or three men send them.
5. As stated above, I think the whole idea should be looked into very carefully before the National Defense organization is put in a ridiculous position comparable to the mountain groaning and bringing forth a mouse.

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s/ RHH - Disp. 3/19/48

R. H. HILLENKOETTER  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

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Director  
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Note for record: Encls are: Memo to Adm. Hillen-  
koetter, 3/18, frm Mr. Only; Memo for Mr.  
Only 3/5/48, frm Lt. Gen. Lutes; Memo for  
Mr. Blum 3/11 frm Mr. Only; Memo for Mr.  
Only 3/16 frm Mr. Blum--all on above subject.

Adm. 3/18

ILLEGIB

16 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. OHLY:

SUBJECT: Unified Attache System

1. With reference to your memorandum of 11 March 1948 and the inclosure from General Lutes, I do not see how it would be harmful, from an intelligence standpoint, to consolidate the offices of Navy, Army and Air attaches for all administrative purposes.

2. As I understand the present position, the difference service attaches at a single post maintain entirely separate administrative establishments and are sometimes housed in different buildings. They have their own files, clerks and communications systems, including codes and ciphers.

3. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 ("Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad") affirmed the principle that coordination of collection activities as desirable:

"3. The senior U. S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign post shall, within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein, be responsible for the coordination of all normal collection activities in his area.

"4. The collecting and reporting facilities of each of the agencies shall be utilized so as to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap and to insure within budgetary limitations that full flow of intelligence information which is the major need of all departments and agencies for the accomplishment of their respective missions."

4. I doubt whether administrative consolidation of coordination can be effectively established unless there is some policy coordination as well, inasmuch as the assignment of personnel, the arrangement of files, the allocation of space, etc., involve the determination of priorities and the establishment of intelligence policy decisions. I am not arguing that this is undesirable but simply that the problem, in my view, may be more than an administrative one.

/s/ R. Blum  
Robert Blum

RB:djh  
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NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT  
MUNITIONS BOARD  
Washington 25, D. C.

ER 8550

5 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. H. OHLY:

Subject: Unified Attache System.

1. There appears to me to be one field in which some minor savings could be made and which does not fall under the purview of the Munitions Board or any of the committees affiliated with the Munitions Board. I refer to the Military, Naval, and Air Attache Sytems.

2. I am informed that the Air Forces are moving to establish separate attache offices in various foreign capitals to which the United States is accredited, and if these offices are established that there would be in each embassy separate property for the Navy, Army, and Air Attaches, separate clerical systems, separate administrative records, separate communications systems, etc.

3. I have not investigated the matter and therefore the foregoing statement is not factual, but based upon hearsay only. However, I suggest that the three Armed Services be questioned on the matter and asked whether or not their attache offices can not be combined for administrative purposes in order to effect the maximum savings in personnel, communications charges, etc.

/s/ Lutes

LeR. LUTES  
Lieutenant General, USA

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

COPY

18 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER

SUBJECT: Unified Attache System

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum from General Lutes with reference to the above subject, which I believe is self-explanatory. Also attached is a memorandum from myself to Mr. Blum and one from Mr. Blum to me concerning the same subject.

2. I would like to ask you the same question that I asked Mr. Blum; namely, are there any sound reasons from an intelligence standpoint which would require the provisions of separate offices, etc., for the Navy, Army, and Air attachés to any particular embassy?

/s/ J. Ohly

John H. Ohly  
Special Assistant to the Secretary

Incls

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington

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ER 8550

11 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BLUM

SUBJECT: Unified Attache Sytem

Attached hereto is a memorandum from General Lutes to me, dated 5 March 1948, with reference to the above subject. I believe it is generally self-explanatory. My question to you is this: Are there any sound reasons, from an intelligence standpoint, which would dictate the provision of separate offices, etc, for the Navy, Army and Air attaches to any particular Embassy? In other words, would it be harmful, from an intelligence standpoint, to consolidate their offices for all administrative purposes?

/s/ JHO

John H. Ohly

Attachment

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